University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1990

Time Limits for Federal Employees under Title VII:
Jurisdictional Prerequisites or Statutes of Limitation
Cynthia Reed

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Reed, Cynthia, "Time Limits for Federal Employees under Title VII: Jurisdictional Prerequisites or Statutes of Limitation" (1990).
Minnesota Law Review. 1060.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1060

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Time Limits for Federal Employees Under Title
VII: Jurisdictional Prerequisites or
Statutes of Limitation?
In 1972, Congress waived federal sovereign immunity from
suit by allowing federal employees to sue their employers for
employment discrimination.' After exhausting administrative
remedies, the federal employee has thirty days to file suit in
federal district court. 2 This Note addresses the nature of this
thirty-day time limit. The Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
hold that the time limit is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit
that absolutely bars untimely claims.3 The Second, Third,
Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits, on the
other hand, hold that the time limit is like a statute of limitations, which may be equitably modified to allow courts to assume jurisdiction over untimely claims. 4 The nature of the
provision is of utmost importance to civil rights plaintiffs, who
often proceed pro se 5 and who may lose their causes of action
through no fault of their own in a circuit adopting the 'jurisdictional' view. The Supreme Court has declined to resolve the
conflict,6 but recently granted certiorari in a case that raises the
issue.7 The issue also has not found a satisfactory resolution in
academic circles. Those arguing that the time limit is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit either fail to analyze congressional
intent completely8 or misconceive the nature of jurisdictional
1. Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 111 (codi-

fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1982)).
2. Id. § 2000e-16(c).
3. See infra notes 70-94 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
5. Pro se plaintiffs appear for themselves and do not retain lawyers for

representation. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1099 (5th ed. 1979).
6. Cooper v. United States Postal Serv., 471 U.S. 1022 (1985) (denial of
certiorari); Stuckett v. United States Postal Serv., 469 U.S. 898 (1984) (denial
of certiorari).
7. Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 874 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. granted,
110 S. Ct. 1109 (1990).
8. Note, Limitations Periods Under Title V- Has Time Run Out on the
Sovereign Immunity Doctrine?63 B.U. L. REV. 1157, 1182-85 (1983) [hereinafter Boston Note] (concluding that Congress expressed no clear intent to allow
equitable modification); see infra note 116 (criticizing the Boston Note's analy-

sis and conclusion).

1371

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

1372

[Vol. 74:1371

bars.9 Those arguing for equitable modification fail to address
the impact of federal sovereign immunity on interpretation of
the time limit.'0
This Note argues that courts can equitably modify the
thirty-day time limit for federal employees to file employment
discrimination suits in federal court. Part I discusses the structure of Title VII, which allows employees to sue for employment discrimination based on race, gender, color, religion or
national origin. Part I also discusses the effect of federal sovereign immunity on construction of that statute, and the circuits'
analyses of the federal employees' thirty-day time limit for filing employment discrimination suits. Part II argues that the
conclusions of the jurisdictional circuits and commentators are
incorrect, and suggests a more solid analysis supporting the equitable modification view. This analysis construes the time
limit in light of its status as a condition in a statute waiving federal sovereign immunity, and concludes that Congress intended
courts to equitably modify the time limit in appropriate
circumstances.
I.

TIME LIMITS IN TITLE VII AND SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY

A.

TrrE VII AND THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 represents the most comprehensive civil rights legislation passed to remedy discrimination." This section details the purposes and structure of Title
VII of the Act, which gave private sector employees a private
9. Note, Equitable Tolling of Title VII Time Limits in Actions Against
the Government, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 199, 217-20 (1988) [hereinafter Cornell
Note] (arguing that § 2000e-16(c) is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, but
that courts may accept jurisdiction over untimely claims if the plaintiff can
show that the government engaged in affirmative misconduct); see infra note
115 (criticizing the Cornell Note's analysis and conclusion).
10. E.g., Note, Equitable Modification of Time Limitations Under Title
WI, 48 U. CFH. L. REv. 1016, 1018 (1981) [hereinafter Chicago Note] (arguing

that all time limits in Title VH are statutes of limitation that may be equitably
modified, but not discussing § 2000e-16(c) in particular and the impact of sovereign immunity on its construction); Note, Equitable Modification of Title

VII Time Limitations to Promote the Statute's Remedial Nature, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 749, 776-79 (1985) [hereinafter Davis Note] (arguing that all time
limits in Title VII are statutes of limitation that may be equitably modified,
and cursorily addressing federal time limits without discussion of the impact of
sovereign immunity on their construction); see infra note 135 and accompanying text (criticizing the Chicago and Davis Notes' analyses).
11. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw vii (2d
ed. 1983).
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cause of action against their employers for employment discrimination; and the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, which
amended Title VII by waiving federal sovereign immunity to
suit for employment discrimination claims by federal employees against their employers. 2
1.

Title VII: The Private Employee's Cause of Action for
Employment Discrimination

In 1964, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
giving employees a private cause of action against their employers for employment discrimination. 13 The Act prohibits discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. 14 As originally enacted, the Act applied only
to private sector employers. I5 The statute set up a two-step
procedure for employees seeking a remedy for employment discrimination. First, the employee must exhaust remedies available within the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). 16 After the employee has exhausted administrative
remedies, the employee may file a civil suit in federal district
court.17
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1982).
13. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 256-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982)).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). This prohibition includes refusals to hire
individuals for employment, segregation, and other discriminatory practices
with regard to employees. I& § 2000e-2(a)-(c). For a thorough analysis of the
scope and purpose of Title VII, which is beyond the scope of this Note, see B.
ScHLEi & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 11, at vii-xiii (discussing history of Title
VII's enactment); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429-30 (1971)
(noting Title VII's objectives).
15. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(b)(1), 78 Stat. 253

(1964).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982). This section provides in part: "A charge
under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and notice of the charge...
shall be served upon the person against whom such charge is made within ten
days thereafter."
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982). This section provides in part:
If a charge filed with the Commission ... is dismissed by the Conmission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such
charge... whichever is later, the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section... or the Commission has not entered into a
conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the
Commission ... shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety
days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought
against the respondent named in the charge.
The statute grants employees the right to a trial de novo of the employment
discrimination claim in federal district court. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973) (construing § 2000e-5(f)(1) to grant a trial de
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The statute contains time limits that claimants must meet
for each step in this procedure - initial filings with the
EEOC'8 and filings in federal district court. 19 Section 2000e5(e) requires that claimants file initial complaints with the
EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory occurrence.20 If the EEOC dismisses or fails to act on the complaint,
the employee has ninety days to file a civil suit against her em21
ployer in federal district court.
2. 1972 Amendments to Title VII: The Federal Employee's
Cause of Action for Employment Discrimination
Because Title VII did not apply to federal employees,22 federal employees had no private cause of action against their employers for employment discrimination.23 Before the 1972
amendments, individual federal agencies handled discrimination charges "parochially."24 Each federal agency was responsible for investigating and judging itself.25
"novo rather than a review of the agency determination on a substantial evidence standard).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982).
19. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
20. I& § 2000e-5(e). Employees in states that have state or local bodies to
investigate employment discrimination (so-called 'deferral states') must file
charges with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged occurrence, or within 30
days after receiving notice that the state or local body terminated the proceedings, whichever is earlier. I This filing allows the agency to determine the
merits of the complaint and to seek conciliation between the employer and
employee to encourage compliance with Title VII. Id. § 2000e-5(b). This section provides in partIf the Commission determines after ...investigation that there is not
reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, it shall dismiss the
charge ....
If the Commission determines after investigation that
there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation,
and persuasion.
21. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The EEOC has sole jurisdiction over the claim for
180 days. Id
22. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(b)(1), 78 Stat. 253
(1964).
23. Although discrimination in federal employment violates both the Constitution and statutory law, before passage of the 1972 Act federal employees
had no judicial remedy for such unlawful conduct. Brown v. General Servs.
Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 825 (1976) (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); 5
U.S.C. § 7151 (1970)).
24. Brown, 425 U.S. at 825.
25. S.REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
Agencies could appoint outside hearing examiners, but the examiners had no
authority to conduct independent investigations and could make only non-
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In reaction to a general lack of confidence in the complaint
procedure26 and a lack of access to the courts,27 Congress
passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act in 1972,s
amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and expanding its coverage. 29 The 1972 Act included relief for federal employees with
claims of employment discrimination 30 This relief served two
binding recommendations to the agency. Id. The employee could appeal the
agency decision only to the Board of Appeals and Review in the Civil Service
Commission, which "rarely reverse[d] the agency decision." H.R. REP. No. 238,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 24, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEws
2137, 2159 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. The House Report noted that this system, "which permits the Civil Service Commission to sit in judgment over its
own practices and procedures... creates a built-in conflict-of-interest" that
"denie[s] employees adequate opportunity for impartial investigation and resolution of complaints." Id26. SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 14. Federal employees "indicated
skepticism regarding the Commission's record in obtaining just resolutions of
complaints and adequate remedies." Id. This skepticism "discouraged persons
from filing complaints with the Commission for fear that it [would] only result
in antagonizing their supervisors and impairing any hope of future advancement." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 25, at 24, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN.NEWS 2159.
27. The Senate Report noted that "an aggrieved Federal employee d[id]
not have access to the courts [because] [i]n many cases, the employee must
overcome a U.S. Government defense of sovereign immunity." SENATE REPORT, supr note 25, at 16; accord HOUSE REPORT, supra note 25, at 25, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2160 (expressing "serious
doubt that court review is available to the aggrieved Federal employee").
28. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86
Stat. 111 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1982).
29. Congress sought to "correct... entrenched discrimination in the Federal service." Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 547 (1974); see Memorandum
Accompanying Executive Order 11,478, 3 C.F.R. p. 803 (1966-70 Comp.) (stating
that "[d]iscrimination of any kind based on factors not relevant to job performance must be eradicated completely from Federal employment"). Congress,
therefore, sought to provide federal employees "the full rights available in the
courts as are granted to individuals in the private sector under title VII." SENATE REPORT, supm note 25, at 16; accord HOUSE REPORT, supm note 25, at 23,
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMNm. NEWS 2158 (stating that "there
can exist no justification for anything but a vigorous effort to accord Federal
employees the same rights and impartial treatment which the law seeks to afford employees in the private sector").
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1982). The prohibition against discrimination by
the federal government is based on the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). Congress previously had
recognized that it is "the policy of the United States to insure equal employment opportunities for employees without discrimination because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378, 523,
codi~fed at 5 U.S.C. § 7201 (1988).
The principal purpose of the 1972 amendments was to provide the EEOC
with meaningful enforcement powers not included in the 1964 Act. SENATE
REPORT, supra note 25, at 4. The amendments also expanded the scope of coy-
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purposes - to remedy the lack of impartiality in the Civil Service Commission's complaint procedure 3l and to give federal
employees access to the courts.3 2 Thus, Congress waived federal sovereign immunity to suit3 3 and gave federal employees a
34
private cause of action against their employers.
The federal employee must follow a two-step procedure
modeled after the private employees' cause of action. First, the
employee must file charges with the EEOC within thirty days
of the discriminatory occurrence.s After exhausting adminiserage of Title VII to cover employers with 15 or more employees instead of 25,
and to include state and local government employees and employees of educational institutions who previously had been exempted. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b)
(1982). The 1972 Act also extended the time limits applicable to private sector
employees. I&. § 2000e-5(e)-(f).
31. See supra note 25.
32. See supra note 27.
33. In several cases, the Supreme Court has interpreted the scope of Congress' consent to waive immunity to suit for employment discrimination in the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. The Court has held that unlike
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which supplements other existing remedies for
employment discrimination, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act provides
the exclusive means for federal employees to pursue discrimination claims.
Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 824, 835 (1976). The Court also
has held that Congress did not intend to waive traditional immunity from prejudgment interest awards. Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318-23
(1986). But see Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 556 (1988) (holding that Congress did intend to waive immunity from prejudgment interest in cases involving administrative agencies that have the right to sue and be sued). The Court
has held, however, that Congress intended to grant federal employees the
same right to a trial de novo in federal court as Title VII provides to private
sector and state government employees. Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840,
845-48 (1976). The Court reasoned that because federal employees are entitled
to file a civil action pursuant to § 2000e-5(f), and because the civil action provided there is a trial de novo, it follows syllogistically that federal employees
are entitled to a trial de novo of their employment discrimination claims. Id
at 845-46.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1982). Providing formal employment discrimination remedies for federal employees met "the obligation of the Federal Government to make all personnel actions free from discrimination based on race,
color, sex, religion or national orgin [sic]." SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at
12. The Senate and House Reports emphasized the strong influence of the federal government, as the largest employer in the nation, in encouraging nondiscrimination in employment. Id; HousE REPORT, supra note 25, at 22,
reprintedin 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2157.
35. The 1972 amendments delegated to the EEOC the power to issue rules
necessary to carry out its responsibilities under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e16(b) (1982). Pursuant to this directive, the EEOC set time limits modeled after the private employees' time limit in § 2000e-5(e) of 180 days. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1613.214 (1989). The EEOC promulgated the following time limits: "The
agency may accept the complaint for processing... only if... [t]he complainant brought to the attention of the Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor
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trative remedies, section 2000e-16(c) provides that federal employees aggrieved by the final disposition of their claims, or by
the failure of the EEOC to take final action on their claims,
may file a civil action in federal district court "within thirty
days of receipt of notice of final [agency] action."' 6 This civil
action is governed by the same provisions applicable to private
sector employees.3 7
Because section 2000e-16(c) is part of a statute that waives
federal sovereign immunity from suit, it is necessary to examine the Supreme Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence
and the rules of construction the Court uses to interpret statutes containing waivers of sovereign immunity.
B. THE DOCTR=nE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNrrY: CONSTRUING
TERMS AND CONDInONS OF THE FEDERAL
GoVERNMENT's WAIVERS OF ImmuNrry TO Sur
Because the federal government is cloaked in sovereign immunity, it cannot be sued without its consent.3s Only Congress
the matter causing him/her to believe he/she had been discriminated against
within 30 calendar days of... [its] effective date." 29 C.F.P. § 1613.214(a)(1)(i)
(1989).
This time limit can be extended if "the complainant shows that he/she
was not notified of the time limits and was not otherwise aware of them, was
prevented by circumstances beyond the complainant's control from submitting
the matter within the time limits; or for other reasons considered sufficient by
the agency." Id. § 1613.214(a)(4) (1989).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1982). This section reads in pertinent part:
Within thirty days of receipt of notice of final action taken by a department, agency, or unit ... or by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission upon an appeal from a decision or order of such
department, agency, or unit on a complaint of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex or national origin ... or after one hundred
and eighty days from the filing of the initial charge with the department, agency, or unit or with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission on appeal from a decision or order of such department,
agency, or unit until such time as final action may be taken by a department, agency, or unit, an employee or applicant for employment,
if aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint, or by the failure
to take final action on his complaint, may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of this title, in which civil action the head of
the department, agency or unit, as appropriate, shall be the
defendant.
37. 1&. § 2000e-16(d). This section provides that "the provisions of section
2000e-5(f) through (k) of this title, as applicable, shall govern civil actions
brought hereunder."
38. United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1940). The sovereign immunity doctrine is affirmed repeatedly in case law. E.g., Lehman v. Nakshian,
453 U.S. 156, 160-61 (1981) (noting that entities can sue the United States only
according to the particular terms and conditions of federal consent statutes);
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can waive the federal government's immunity from suit.s9 Statutes that waive sovereign immunity to suit are called "consent
statutes," and Congress may limit its consent to certain terms
and conditions. 4° Because of the underlying sovereign immuEastern Transp. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 675, 686 (1927) (stating that the
sovereignty of the United States raises a presumption against its vulnerability
to suit, and unless consent is clearly shown the courts should not enlarge its
liability to suit beyond what the statutory language requires).
Sovereign immunity's theoretical basis in United States law, however, is
unclear. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 208 (1882) (stating that the
Supreme Court has never explained or justified the basis for sovereign immunity of the United States). The first case recognizing the doctrine was Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). Justice Marshall noted "[t]he universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted
against the United States; that the judiciary act does not authorize such suits."
Id, at 411-12. The Supreme Court has referred to the doctrine as an inherent
quality of statehood. Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122, 126 (1869).
The Court stated that "[e]very government has an inherent right to protect itself against suits ....The principle is fundamental, applies to every sovereign
power, and but for the protection which it affords, the government would be
unable to perform the various duties for which it was created." Id. at 126;
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 582 (1934) (stating that immunity from
suit is an attribute of sovereignty). The Court also has called sovereign immunity a "familiar doctrine of the common law," The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152,
153-54 (1869), and a public policy or administrative necessity. E.g., Shaw, 309
U.S. at 501 (stating that the reason for immunity is a blend of practical administrative necessity, political desirability, and governmental dignity and decorum); Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331, 342 (1907) (stating that
sovereignty of United States is based on public policy).
The Court also has criticized the sovereign immunity doctrine. See, e.g.,
Lee, 106 U.S. at 204-09. In Lee, the Court criticized the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in a democratic state. Id. at 208. Because the people rather than a
monarch are sovereign in the United States, the Court reasoned that once a
court of competent jurisdiction has established an individual's right to property, "there is no reason why deference to any person, natural or artificial, not
even the United States, should prevent him from using the means which the
law gives him for the protection and enforcement of that right." Id. at 209.
The Court noted that "[w]hile the exemption of the United States... from
being subjected as defendants to ordinary actions in the courts has ... been
repeatedly asserted [by the Court], the principle has never been discussed or
the reasons for it given, but it has always been treated as an established doctrine." Id. at 207.
39. United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 513
(1940) (stating that federal officials cannot waive federal sovereign immunity);
The Siren, 74 U.S. at 14 (stating that "whoever institutes ... proceedings
[against the United States] must bring his case within the authority of some
act of Congress").
40. See United States Fidelity, 309 U.S. at 512 (holding that cross claims
against the United States are justiciable only in those courts in which Congress consents to their consideration); Nichls, 74 U.S. at 126 (holding that consent statute required written protest, signed by party, as condition precedent
to suit for recovery of wrongfully collected taxes).
The United States even may withdraw its consent to be sued for contrac-
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nity from suit, such terms and conditions of consent statutes
define a court's jurisdiction to hear cases against the federal
government. 41
The Supreme Court construes statutes first to determine
whether Congress has waived federal sovereign immunity to
suit, and then to determine the scope of such a waiver. 42 The
Supreme Court usually labels its method of interpreting consent statutes "strict construction."' 4 This conclusory label is
not very helpful in application, because the Court looks to different factors depending on the language of the statute and the
particular term or condition to suit at issue. The Court's
method of construing consent statutes has three tiers. First,
the Court may look only to the express language of the consent
statute to find whether Congress expressly has prohibited a
tual obligations once given. Lynch, 292 U.S. at 581. The Court stated that
"[t]he contracts between a Nation and an individual are only binding on the
conscience of the sovereign and have no pretensions to compulsive force. They
confer no right of action independent of the sovereign will." Id. at 580-81
(quoting THE FEDERALIST, No. 81, at 446 (A. Hamilton) (Scott ed. 1894)).
41. Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 277 (1957); United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).
42. When a consent statute contains a statute of limitation, the limitations
provision "constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity. Accordingly, although [the Court] should not construe such a time-bar provision
unduly restrictively, [the Court] must be careful not to interpret it in a manner that would 'extend the waiver beyond that which Congress intended."'
Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983) (quoting United States v.
Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979)) (construing 12-year time limit in Quiet Title Act); see infra note 44 and accompanying text (setting out text of Quiet Title Act's time limitation). The Court has stated that words in a consent statute
must "be 'interpreted in the light of the general purposes of the statute and of
its other provisions, and with due regard to those practical ends which are to
be served by any limitation of the time within which an action must be
brought."' Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503, 517 (1967)
(quoting Reading Co. v. Koons, 271 U.S. 58, 62 (1926)). The consent statute at
issue provided that "every civil action against the United States shall be barred
unless commenced within six years." Id. at 507 (emphasis added).
43. The Court construes such waivers of sovereign immunity "[a]gainst
the background of complete immunity." United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495,
502 (1940). The Court has found that "policy, no matter how compelling, is insufficient, standing alone, to waive .. .immunity." Library of Congress v.
Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 321 (1986) (requiring express congressional consent to the
award of prejudgment interest separate from general waiver of immunity to
suit). The Court was especially strict in this case because of the deeply rooted
"no-interest" rule of sovereign immunity, which provides that interest cannot
be collected on recoveries against the United States. Id. at 316-18; see also Boston Note, supra note 8, at 1177 (arguing that Supreme Court requires a "dear
statement" in consent statute to manifest intent to be subject to particular
term or condition of suit); Cornell Note, supra note 9, at 201 (same).
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particular term or condition of suit." Second, if a party argues
44. After the Court determines that a statute waives immunity from suit,
it must determine the parameters of that waiver. The Court often refuses to
imply terms into a consent statute and will look primarily to whether the
plain language of a particular provision prohibits suit against the United States
under certain conditions. See Library of Congress, 478 U.S. at 319 (stating that
congressional silence does not permit a court to read provisions into the waiver
of sovereign immunity); Eastern Transp. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 675, 686
(1927) (stating that the Court should not enlarge the sovereign's liability beyond what the statutory language requires); see also Lehman v. Nakshian, 453
U.S. 156, 160-61 (1981) (waiver of immunity in Age Discrimination in Employment Act does not include right to jury trial); Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 586
(waiver of immunity in Court of Claims does not include right to jury trial).
Because consent statutes define the Court's jurisdiction to hear cases against
the federal government, Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 587, the Court strictly construes
the terms and conditions of such statutes in favor of the federal government.
McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951); Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 590;
Shaw, 309 U.S. at 502.
The Court often looks to emphatic language to determine whether Congress intended to prohibit suit if a particular term or condition were not met.
Cases construing time limits in consent statutes are good examples of such express prohibitions of conditions to suit. The Court generally has not allowed
for equitable modification of time limitations in consent statutes. But see
Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484, 500-01 (1967) (holding that time limit could be
equitably tolled to resolve claims to seized alien property because the funds
were not controlled by the United States treasury).
The Court, however, only has construed time limits that have contained
emphatic language clearly manifesting congressional intent to bar untimely
claims. For example, the Quiet Title Act provides that "[a]ny civil action...
shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve years of the date upon
which it accrued." 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(f) (1988) (emphasis added). Other consent statutes contain similar emphatic prohibitions. The Federal Tort Claims
Act provides that
[a] tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless
it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within
two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six
months after the date of mailing... of notice of final denial of the
claim by the agency to which it was presented.
28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1988) (emphasis added). In the Court of Claims, "[e]very
civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the
complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues." 28
U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1988) (emphasis added). The Court has held these time limits expressly prohibit equitable modification. Such time limits, therefore, define the court's subject matter jurisdiction over the case against the
government. If missed, the court is without authority to hear the case. United
States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 851 (1986) (construing time limit in Quiet Title
Act); Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117-18 (construing time limit in Federal Tort Claims
Act); Kendall v. United States, 107 U.S. 123, 124 (1883) (construing time limits
in Court of Claims); accordBlock, 461 U.S. at 284 (1983) (construing time limit
in Quiet Title Act). The Court has yet to construe a statute containing a time
limit without the emphatic "shall be barred" language.
The Civil Service Reform Act provides that cases "must be filed within
thirty days after the date the individual filing the case received notice of the
judicially reviewable action." 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
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that Congress has consented to an unusual condition to suit, the
Court requires express consent to that unusual term.4 Finally,
the Court may find the language of the statute ambiguous and
therefore look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the statute's enactment to imply consent to a term or condition
of suit.46 Under the totality approach, the Court has looked be47
yond the statutory language of a provision to public policy,
One circuit has held that this provision constitutes a jurisdictional prerequisite
to suit. King v. Dole, 782 F.2d 274, 276 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 856
(1986).
45. Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 319 (1986). The Court
stated:
The no-interest rule provides an added gloss of strictness upon [the
usual consent statute construction] rules. "Inhere can be no consent
by implication or by use of ambiguous language. Nor can an intent on
the part of the framers of a statute... to permit the recovery of interest suffice where the intent is not translated into affirmative statutory
*. . terms."

Id at 318 (quoting United States v. N.Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654, 659
(1947)). The Supreme Court also has refused to construe consent statutes as
requiring the sovereign to pay attorneys fees. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463
U.S. 680, 685 n.7 (1983) (stating that "[i]f Congress had intended the truly radical departure from American and English common law [rules of no attorneys
fees]. ...it no doubt would have used explicit language to this effect").
46. In these cases, the Court has implied congressional consent to terms
and conditions in consent statutes when emphatic language of express consent
or prohibition was absent or ambiguous. One tool the Court has used to imply
consent is to reverse the presumption that Congress must 'opt in' to a term of
suit, and instead presuming that Congress must 'opt out.' E.g., United States v.
Yellow Cab, 340 U.S. 543, 556-57 (1951).
The policy underlying the implied consent cases is that "[tihe exemption
of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough where consent has been
withheld [and the Court will not] add to its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been announced." Id. at 554. The Court, in holding
that the Federal Tort Claims Act allowed the United States to be sued for contribution or impleaded as a third party defendant, despite the lack of specific
language in the consent statute, recognized "a clearly defined breadth of purpose for the bill as a whole and the general trend toward increasing the scope
of the waiver by the United States," and stated that it would be inconsistent to
whittle this consent down by refinements. Id. at 550.
Furthermore, the Court, rather than presuming Congress was immune
from impleader absent clear intent to the contrary, presumed Congress was
not immune from impleader "without a clearer statement of it than appears
here." IM at 552. Thus the Yellow Cab Court reversed the usual presumption
that absent express consent to a particular term, such a term may not be implied in the statute. The Court in effect held that absent clear intent not to be
subject'to impleader, the Court would presume the consent statute included
such a term. See also Becker Steel Co. v. Cummings, 296 U.S. 74, 80 (1935)
(holding that only compelling language in a consent statute would be construed as withdrawing or curtailing the privilege of suit for violation of the
United States' constitutional obligations).
47. The Davis, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 15, 19 (1870) (holding that when the
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legislative history, 48 and underlying statutory purpose. 49
C.

CONSTRUCTION

OF SECTION 2000E-16(c) AS A CONDITION TO

SUIT IN A CONSENT STATUTE: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

The following section will discuss first the Supreme
Court's case law construing Title VII's private sector time limits, and then the circuit courts' reasoning used to interpret section 2000e-16(c).
1.

Construction of Time Limits in Title VII Private Sector

Suits
Title VII contains two time limits for private employees,
the 180-day time limit for filing an initial charge with the
EEOC found in section 2000e-5(e), and the ninety-day time
limit for filing in federal court found in section 2000e-5(f)(1). °
After enactment of Title VII, lower federal courts reached different conclusions regarding the nature of the two time limits.51 Some courts held that the time limits operated as
jurisdictional prerequisites 52 that bar claims of plaintiffs who
property of the government has been salvaged while at sea "justice and sound
policy require that [the government] should be held to bear its share of the
burden [of costs] which the unanimous voice of maritime nations imposes on
all other property in like condition").
48. Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 848-61 (1976). In Chandler,the
Court implied consent to a trial de novo under the 1972 amendments to Title
VII. Hi at 848 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16). Even though a presumption
against de novo review of agency decisions exists, the Court did not cite the
strict construction rule, but ascertained congressional intent by looking at the
structure of Title VII and the 1972 amendments, and legislative history. Id. at
848-61.
49. Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503, 517 (1967) (stating that words in a consent statute must be interpreted in light of the general
purposes of the statute). The Court therefore has stated that "waiver of sovereign immunity is accomplished not by a ritualistic formula; rather intent to
waive immunity and the scope of such a waiver can only be ascertained by reference to underlying congressional policy." Franchise Tax Board v. United
States Postal Serv., 487 U.S. 512, 521 (1984). The Court has construed most liberally waivers of immunity for administrative agencies that have been given
the power to "sue and be sued." See id, at 520; Federal Hous. Admin. v. Burr,
309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940) (stating that waivers of immunity in cases of federal
agencies should be liberally construed).
The Court also has ascertained congressional intent to waive immunity
from suit broadly by loking at policies behind a series of statutes. Keifer &
Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 375, 389 (1939).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1982); id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
51. Chicago Note, supr note 10, at 1017-18.
52. If a time limit defines a court's subject matter jurisdiction, failure to
meet that time limit deprives the court of power to hear the case. Lack of sub-

1990]

TITLE VII

1383

miss either the section 2000e-5(e) initial charge deadline for fil-

ing with the EEOC 53 or the section 2000e-5(f)(1) civil suit filing

deadline.- Other courts held that the time limits were in the
nature of a statute of limitation,-s which a court may extend
under the doctrines of equitable tolling, waiver, and estoppel.56
The Supreme Court settled these disputes in two cases, finding
that both time limits may be equitably modified in appropriate
ject matter jurisdiction may be raised by the parties or the court sua sponte at
any time during the proceedings. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1393, at 866-67 (West 1969 & Supp. 1987). It is impossible to waive or be estopped from asserting a subject matter jurisdiction
defense. I& at 863; Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).
53. E.g., Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228, 1233 (8th Cir.
1975) (holding that federal court only has jurisdiction if employment discrimination charge is timely filed with the EEOC); Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459
F.2d 811, 821-22 n.26 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding time limit for filing with EEOC in
deferral states jurisdictional and therefore not subject to equitable tolling); see
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 n.6 (1982) (noting lower
court split).
54. E.g., Cleveland v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 509 F.2d 1027, 1029-30 (9th Cir.
1975) (per curiam); Genovese v. Shell Oil Co., 488 F.2d 84, 85 (5th Cir. 1973)
(per curiam); Archuleta v. Duffy's Inc., 471 F.2d 33, 34 (10th Cir. 1973); see
Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393 n.6 (noting lower court split).
55. E.g., Carlile v. South Routt School Dist. RE 3-J, 652 F.2d 981, 985 (10th
Cir. 1981) (holding time limit for initial filing of charge subject to equitable
tolling); Leake v. University of Cincinnati, 605 F.2d 255, 259 (6th Cir. 1979)
(holding that all Title VII time limits are statutes of limitation and equitable
principles may be applied to extend them); Hart v. J.T. Baker Chem. Corp.,
598 F.2d 829, 831 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding time limit for initial filing of charge
subject to equitable modification such as tolling); Cottrell v. Newspaper
Agency Corp., 590 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding that plaintiff had
shown no grounds for equitably tolling the filing period with the court); Harris
v. Walgreen's Distrib. Center, 456 F.2d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 1972) (holding that
pending motion for appointment of counsel tolls time limit for filing in federal
court); see Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393 n.6 (noting lower court split).
56. In contrast to time limits that define a court's subject matter jurisdiction, failure to meet a statute of limitation is an affirmative defense that a
party can waive if not asserted at the appropriate time, or be estopped from
asserting. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1394, at 869 n.79 (West 1969 & Supp. 1987). The doctrine of equitable modification applies when a claimant receives inadequate notice of her right to sue,
when a claimant's motion to proceed in forma pauperis or for appointment of
counsel is pending in the federal district court, when the court has led the
claimant to believe that she has done everything required of her, or when the
claimant's employer has lulled the plaintiff into inaction by affirmative misconduct. Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984)
(per curiam). Tolling of a time limit in a federal statute is appropriate when
"congressional purpose is effectuated by tolling the statute of limitation in
given circumstances." Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 321 (1965).
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circumstances. 57
The Court determined that the section 2000e-5(e) 180-day
private employee time limit for filing an initial charge with the
EEOC was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in Zipes v.
Trans World Airlines.ss Thus, courts may hear untimely
claims in certain circumstances. The Court first noted that section 2000e-5(f)(3), the Title VII provision granting jurisdiction
to federal district courts,59 does not explicitly condition jurisdiction on timely filing or make reference to the section 2000e5(e) 180-day filing requirement. 6° Rather, the filing requirements are in an entirely different provision unrelated to the
grant of jurisdiction. 61 The Court reasoned that because the filing time limit and the grant of jurisdiction were placed in separate sections of the statute, it was unlikely that Congress
intended to limit the federal courts' jurisdiction in cases of untimely initial filings.62 The Court then examined the remedial
purpose of Title VII and determined that a technical jurisdictional reading of the time limit would be inappropriate in a
statutory scheme in which most plaintiffs are laypersons who
initiate the process unassisted by lawyers.a3
The Court construed the section 2000e-5(f)(1) ninety-day
private employee time limit for filing in federal court after an
adverse agency action in Baldwin County Welcome Center v.
Brown.64 Although the Court held that the plaintiff in this
case did not merit equitable extension of the section 2000e5(f)(1) time limit,65 the Court did note instances in which equi57. Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393 (holding the § 2000e-5(e) time limit for filing initial charge with EEOC not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit); Baldwin
County Welcome Center, 466 U.S. at 151 (holding the § 2000e-5(f)(1) 90-day
time limit for filing civil suit subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases).
58. 455 U.S. 385 (1982).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) provides that "[e]ach United States district
court... shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter."
60. Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393-94.
61. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970)).
62. Id at 393-94.
63. Id. at 397 (quoting Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972)).
Zipes was a class action alleging that the defendant airline unlawfully
grounded flight attendants who became new mothers while allowing new fathers to continue to fly. Id at 388. In Zipes, the Court allowed equitable modification of the initial filing time limit by holding that not all class members
need file timely charges with the EEOC in order to qualify for relief in the
subsequent civil suit. See id at 393.
64. 466 U.S. 147 (1984).
65. Id. at 151-52.
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table tolling of section 2000e-5(f)(1) would be appropriate.6
2.

Construction of Time Limits in Title VII Public Sector

Suits
Zipes and Baldwin County resolved the uncertainty as to
time limits in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and thus clarified
these provisions for private sector employees. The Supreme
Court, however, has not clarified the time limits for federal emL6
ployees found in the 1972 amendments to Title VII.
The circuit courts are split in interpreting section 2000e16(c), the thirty-day time limit for federal employees to file in
district court. Three circuits hold that the section 2000e-16(c)
time limit is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit that bars untimely claims.68 Six circuits hold that the section 2000e-16(c)
time limit is a statute of limitations that may be equitably
69
modified.
66. Id. at 151; see supra note 55 for a list of appropriate circumstances for
equitable tolling.
67. The Court may resolve this issue when it decides Irwin v. Veterans
Admin., 874 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1989), cert granted, 110 S. Ct. 1109 (1990).
68. These are the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. See infra notes 7094 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasoning of these circuits.
The First Circuit has not resolved the question. See Rys v. United States Postal Serv., 886 F.2d 443, 446-47 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding summary judgment of
pro se plaintiff's action appropriate whether the § 2000e-16(c) time limit is jurisdictional prerequisite or statute of limitation because the First Circuit only
allows equitable modification of time limits when the defendant "actively misled" the plaintiff).
If the First Circuit eventually becomes an equitable modification circuit, it
may be a harsh one. Rys argued that the EEOC's right-to-sue letter was so
ambiguous as to actually mislead him into suing the wrong defendant, the
United States Postal Service and three local department heads, instead of the
Postmaster General. Id. The letter instructed Rys to "name the appropriate
official agency or department head as the defendant." I&. at 446. Rys argued
that this instruction could be read in the disjunctive, allowing him to name
either the agency itself or its head. Id. at 446-47. The court rejected this argument because the letter also "clearly and unequivocally" defined department
as "the overall national organization ...not the local administrative department where you might work" Id, at 447 (emphasis in original). This definition, however, doesn't really respond to Rys's disjunctive argument, because
he did in fact name the national agency. Id. The court further noted that
"[h]ad he relied upon and been misled by the EEOC letter, he would have
named only the [United States Postal Service]. His inclusion of local department heads - in direct contravention to the EEOC's missive - belies his alleged reliance upon its instructions." IE (emphasis in original).
69. These are the Second, Third, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and District of
Columbia Circuits. See infra notes 95-108 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasoning of these circuits.
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a. The JurisdictionalCircuits: Untimely Filing is an
Absolute Bar to Suit
The Fifth,70 Seventh,71 and Ninth 72 Circuits adhere to a jurisdictional reading of section 2000e-16(c). This reading bars
untimely filed claims regardless of the reasons for the delay.73
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits originally construed section
2000e-16(c) as a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit merely by extending the reasoning of pre-Zipes private sector cases to the
federal sector.74 The courts found no reason for different interpretations of the private and federal sector time limits. 75 Even

after the Supreme Court decided in Zipes that the private sector time limits were statutes of limitation these circuits reaffirmed the jurisdictional nature of section 2000e-16(c). 76
These circuits have relied on the strict construction rule,
finding that the section 2000e-16(c) time limit is a term in the
sovereign's consent to be sued that must be strictly construed in
favor of the government. 77 In Sims v. Heckler,78 the Seventh
Circuit first used the sovereign immunity rationale to differentiate between private and federal sector time limits, construing
the EEOC regulatory time limit for initial filings as jurisdic70. Irwin, 874 F.2d at 1093; Brown v. Department of Army, 854 F.2d 77, 78
(5th Cir. 1988); Bell v. Veterans Admin. Hosp., 826 F.2d 357, 360 (5th Cir. 1987).
71. Harris v. Brock, 835 F.2d 1190, 1194 (7th Cir. 1987); Gaballah v. Johnson, 629 F.2d 1191, 1199 n.11 (7th Cir. 1980).
72. Johnston v. Home, 875 F.2d 1415, 1419 (9th Cir. 1989); Cooper v.
United States Postal Serv., 740 F.2d 714, 716 (9th Cir. 1984), cerL denied, 471
U.S. 1022 (1985); Rice v. Hamilton Air Force Base Commissary, 720 F.2d 1082,
1083 (9th Cir. 1983); Mahroom v. Hook, 563 F.2d 1369, 1374 (9th Cir. 1977), cert
denied, 436 U.S. 904 (1978).
73. See, e.g., Harris,835 F.2d at 1194.
74. Gaballah v. Johnson, 629 F.2d 1191, 1199 n.11 (7th Cir. 1980) (stating
that the § 2000e-16 30-day time limit is a jurisdictional prerequisite and may be
raised sua sponte by the court) (citing In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings
in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1151-52 (7th Cir. 1978) (construing time
limit in private employer cases); Eastland v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 553
F.2d 364, 368 (5th Cir.) (citing Genovese v. Shell Oil Co., 488 F.2d 84, 85 (5th
Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (construing time limit in private employer cases), cert
denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1977).
75. Gaballah,629 F.2d at 1199 n.11; Eastland,553 F.2d at 368.
76. Williams v. United States Postal Serv., 873 F.2d 1069, 1074 (7th Cir.
1989). In Antoine v. United States Postal Serv., 781 F.2d 433, 439 n.6 (5th Cir.
1986), the Fifth Circuit in dicta questioned the validity of its Eastlandholding
because it relied on private sector cases that Zipzes overruled. The court, however, definitively reaffirmed the Eastlandholding in later cases. Brown v. Department of Army, 854 F.2d 77, 78 (5th Cir. 1988); Bell v. Veterans Admin.
Hosp., 826 F.2d 357, 360 (5th Cir. 1987).
77. Brown, 854 F.2d at 78; Harris,835 F.2d at 1194.
78. 725 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1984).
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tional. 79 In holding the regulatory time limit a jurisdictional
prerequisite, the court reasoned that the Zipes holding should
not extend to federal employees because these time limits constituted terms of Congress' consent to be sued, and as such,
must be strictly construed in favor of the government. 0 The
Seventh Circuit then extended the reasoning of Sims to the
section 2000e-16(c) time limit.8 1
82
Despite the circuit's consistent jurisdictional holdings,
however, the court apparently has allowed equitable tolling of
the section 2000e-16(c) time limit in one case.83 The Seventh
79. Id- at 1145. The court construed 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214 (1976), the
EEOC-promulgated time limit for filing initial complaints with the agency aftar a discriminatory occurrence. I& at 1144-46. The Seventh Circuit recently
overruled Sims, noting that all other circuits addressing the issue had found
the regulatory time limit non-jurisdictional. Rennie v. Garrett, 896 F.2d 1057,
1059-60 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
80. Sims, 725 F.2d at 1145-46. The court noted the EEOC's regulation had
"the force and effect of law." Id. at 1146.
81. Williams v. United States Postal Serv., 873 F.2d 1069, 1074 (7th Cir.
1989); Harris,835 F.2d at 1194. But see Paulk v. Department of Air Force, 830
F.2d 79, 81-83 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding § 2000e-16(c) jurisdictional, but allowing
for equitable tolling while the plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis
was pending in the district court).
In Harris,the court noted the circuit split over § 2000e-16(c) and rejected
on sovereign immunity grounds the reasoning of the circuits allowing equitable modification. The court found these analyses inadequate because "they fail
to consider the impact of the doctrine of sovereign immunity when the government is the defendant." Id. at 1194. The court reasoned: "Courts must strictly
construe any conditions attached to the government's waiver of sovereign immunity. The filing periods that apply specifically to Title VII suits brought
against federal employers are such conditions. Therefore, these time limits define a district court's subject matter jurisdiction .... ." Id. at 1193 (citations
omitted).
In Harris,the plaintiff did not properly file a complaint within 30 days of
the agency's final determination because he mailed a copy of the summons and
complaint to the local office of the Department of Labor. I& at 1191. Rule 4
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires, however, that a party suing a
federal agency must serve the United States Attorney for the district and send
both the Attorney General and the defendant agency copies of the summons
and complaint by registered mail. I& at 1192. Harris failed to use registered
mail to serve the Department of Labor, and completely failed to serve the
United States Attorney for the district and the Attorney General. Therefore
his service of process was ineffective. I& Because the court refused to overrule Sims, the court refused to extend the § 2000e-16(c) time limit and dismissed the suit. Id. at 1193.
82. Williams, 873 F.2d at 1074; Harris,835 F.2d at 1193; Gaballah,629 F.2d
1191, 1199 n.11 (7th Cir. 1980).
83. Paulk, 830 F.2d at 81-83. In Paulk, the court restated that § 2000e16(c) is jurisdictional, but allowed for tolling of the time period while plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis was pending. Id at 83. The court
later distinguished Paulk as a case in which "although [the Paulk court] recog-
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Circuit has overruled the Sims jurisdictional holding on the

regulatory time limit,8 4 but has not yet reevaluated the nature
of section 2000e-16(c) in light of that ruling.
The Fifth Circuit has relied on a sovereign immunity rationale to interpret section 2000e-16(c) as a jurisdictional prerequisite in only one case.8s In Brown v. Department of Army,
the court cited the Seventh Circuit's sovereign immunity discussion in Sims.86 The court thus held that because section
2000e-16(c) is a term in a consent statute, courts are without jurisdiction to hear untimely claims.8 7 The Fifth Circuit still adheres to this holding,88 but has noted the severity of the
nized the 30-day period is jurisdictional in nature," the court had to create an
exception or it would "violate equal protection because similar claims would
be treated drastically differently only on the basis of the speed with which the
court chose to process them." Williams, 873 F.2d at 1074 n.6.
In Williams, the plaintiff failed to comply with § 2000e-16(c), which requires that "the head of the department, agency, or unit, as appropriate, shall
be the defendant," in the civil suit. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1982). The plaintiff should have sued the Postmaster General, but instead sued only the
United States Postal Service and the head of the Indianapolis postal service division. Id at 1071. The court held that the plaintiff could not amend her complaint because the correct defendant did not have notice of institution of the
suit within the 30-day time limit as required by FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c), and this
30-day time limit could not be equitably extended. Id at 1073. See Schiavone
v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 29 (1986) (construing FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) and holding
that amendment to correct defendant's name does not relate back unless defendant has notice of institution of the suit within the period provided by law
for commencing the action).
84. Rennie v. Garrett, 896 F.2d 1057, 1062 (7th Cir. 1990).
85. Brown v. Department of Army, 854 F.2d 77, 78 (5th Cir. 1988).
86. Id. at 78 n.1 (citing Sims v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir.
1984).
87. Id. at 78.
88. Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 874 F.2d 1092, 1093 (5th Cir. 1989), cert
granted, 110 S. Ct. 1109 (1990). In Irwin, notice of the EEOC's final decision
and right-to-sue letter were delivered to plaintiff's attorney's office on March
23, 1987. 874 F.2d at 1093. Irwin learned of the delivery on April 7, and filed
suit in federal court on May 6, 1987. Id. The court held that receipt of the
right-to-sue letter by Irwin's attorney's office constituted "constructive notice"
and thus began the § 2000e-16(c) 30-day time limit. Id. at 1095. Irwin's claim
therefore was barred. Id.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Irwin to address two issues.
First, "[ijs [the] 30-day period for filing suit for federal employees pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 [an] absolute jurisdictional requirement, or, as in [the]
case of non-federal employment discrimination cases, in [the] nature of [a]
statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling?" Irwin, 58 U.S.L.W. 3526
(Feb. 20, 1990) (editor's comments). Second, the Court will decide whether
"receipt other than actual receipt by claimant or claimant's attorney of notice
of final action issued by EEOC [is] sufficient for initiating [the] running of
[the] 30-day filing period requirement" of § 2000e-16(c). Id. The Court thus
could answer the constructive notice question negatively and avoid reaching
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jurisdictional rule, 9 and has expressed a desire to reconsider
precedent disallowing equitable modification of section 2000e-

16(c). 9°

The Ninth Circuit originally held the section 2000e-5(f)(1)
time limit in private employer suits a jurisdictional prerequisite
to suit in Cleveland v. Douglas Aircraft Company.91 Before
Zipes, the court originally cited to Cleveland 92 in holding that
the nature of § 2000e-16(c), because Irwin did file within 30 days of actual notice of her right to sue. Irwin, 874 F.2d at 1093. This interpretation of "notice"
would be consistent with the Court's summary action in Hernandez, in which
it avoided the jurisdictional issue and focused instead on the interpretation of
"filing." Hernandez v. Rice, 110 S. Ct. 1314, 1314 (1990); see infra note 90 (discussing Hernandez).
89. Bell v. Veterans Admin. Hosp., 826 F.2d 357, 360 (5th Cir. 1987). The
court stated "we are not unsympathetic to Bell's request for equitable relief,
and we certainly understand his frustrations as a pro se plaintiff in dealing
with complex procedural requirements that may seem unnecessarily burdensome." Id. In Bell, the plaintiff failed to name the head of the Veterans' Administration as a defendant and instead named only the Administration itself.
Id. at 359. The clerk of court stamped the plaintiff's timely complaint "received" and assured Bell that the office would serve the necessary party. Id.
The complaint was not actually stamped "filed" until after Bell's motions for
appointment of counsel and to proceed in forma pauperis were heard - 47
days after the § 2000e-16(c) 30-day time limit began. Id The court refused to
allow Bell to amend his complaint to name the Veterans Administrator as defendant because the Administrator had no notice of the suit within the 30-day
time limit, as required by FED. L Civ. P. 15(c). Id. at 360.
90. Hernandez v. Aldridge, 866 F.2d 800, 803 (5th Cir. 1989), vacated, Hernandez v. Rice, 110 S. Ct. 1314 (1990). The court of appeals felt bound by precedent not to equitably extend the filing time limit. Id. at 801. The plaintiff
filed his complaint with the district court clerk, who marked it "received" but
did not actually file it until 40 days after the plaintiff's time limit began to
run. Id. The court noted that "[p]erhaps... the time has come for this Court
to consider anew its decisions in this area so as to avoid inequitable results."
Id- at 803. The Supreme Court granted Hernandez' petition for a writ of certiorari and summarily vacated the Fifth Circuit's judgment. Hernandez v. Rice,
110 S. Ct. 1314, 1314 (1990). The Court remanded to the Fifth Circuit to consider "whether or not, in all of the circumstances of the case, receipt of the
non-defective complaint by the district court Clerk's office constituted a 'filing'
for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c)." Id. The Court therefore appears
aware of the harshness of the jurisdictional rule and seems willing to construe
the filing requirement of § 2000e-16(c) liberally in favor of pro se plaintiffs.
The discouraging aspect of the Hernandez summary order is that the Court
implicitly accepted that the Fifth Circuit correctly found the time limit jurisdictional and looked for a way to circumvent this holding. A better approach
would be to recognize that § 2000e-16(c) may be equitably modified for such
things as clerk error, rather than to strain to interpret Hernandez' mere dropping off of a complaint as a "filing."
91. 509 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
92. Mahroom v. Hook, 563 F.2d 1369, 1374 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing Cleveland
v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 509 F.2d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir. 1975)), cert denied, 436
U.S. 904 (1978).
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the section 2000e-16(c) time limit was jurisdictional. 9 3 Even
though Cleveland is no longer good law after Zipes, the circuit
has never independently analyzed the nature of the federal
time limit. 9 ' To avoid the harsh results of the jurisdictional
rule, the Ninth Circuit has construed other requirements of
95
section 2000e-16 more liberally.
b.

The Equitable Modifwation Circuits: Untimely Claims
May Be Heard in AppropriateCircumstances

The circuits allowing equitable modification of section
2000e-16(c) fall into two categories. Some circuits allow equitable modification of section 2000e-16(c) by extending the rationales of Zipes, Baldwin County and other private sector cases
to the federal employee context. One court addresses and refutes the sovereign immunity arguments of the jurisdictional
circuits and implies consent into section 2000e-16(c) for equitable modification.
The Third,9 Tenth,9 and Eleventh 98 Circuits assume juris93. Johnston v. Home, 875 F.2d 1415, 1419 (9th Cir. 1989); Cooper v.
United States Postal Serv., 740 F.2d 714, 716 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Rice v.
Hamilton Air Force Base Commissary, 720 F.2d 1082, 1083 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1022 (1985)); Rice, 720 F.2d at 1083 (citing Mahroom, 563 F.2d
at 1374); Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Mahroom,
563 F.2d at 1374).
In Johnston, the plaintiff failed to name the Secretary of the Navy as defendant as required by § 2000e-16(c), but instead named the commander of the
shipyard where he worked. Id. at 1419. The court denied his rule 15(c) motion
to amend to correct the defendant. Id.
94. Rice, 720 F.2d at 1085. The court held that § 2000e-16(c) is jurisdictional, but allowed an untimely plaintiff to go forward anyway. Id The plaintiff filed his right-to-sue letter together with a motion for appointment of
counsel within the 30-day limit. Id. The court circumvented its jurisdictional
holding by also holding that the documents filed were sufficiently similar to a
complaint to satisfy the statutory filing requirements, reasoning that "[t]he intention to institute an action is plainly present when a pro se plaintiff requests
counsel specifically to prosecute an action." Id. The court further held that
although the plaintiff named the wrong defendant on the motion form, the
correct defendant had sufficient notice because he was named in the appended
right-to-sue letter. Id.
95. Hornsby v. United States Postal Serv., 787 F.2d 87, 89 (3d Cir. 1986).
96. Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107, 1109-10 (10th Cir. 1984).
97. Washington v. Ball, 890 F.2d 413, 415 (11th Cir. 1989); Ross v. United
States Postal Serv., 814 F.2d 616, 616-17 (11th Cir. 1987); Milam v. United
States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 860, 862 (11th Cir. 1982).
98. Neither do these courts address any potential differences between
§ 2000e-5(e), governing initial filing with the EEOC, and § 2000e-16(c), governing subsequent filing in federal district court. See, e.g., Sousa v. NLRB, 817
F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (rejecting constructive notice doctrine
and tolling the § 2000e-16 time period until plaintiff actually received his right-
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diction over untimely complaints when equity requires. These
circuits generally cite Zipes and merely extend the Zipes holding allowing equitable modification of section 2000e-5(e), the
time limit for filing with the EEOC, to section 2000e-16(c) by
analogy. These circuits do not analyze the sovereign immunity
problem, 99 but rather find no reason to construe section 2000e16(c) differently from the private sector time limits. The Second Circuit has allowed equitable tolling of section 2000e-16(c)
by extending private sector cases construing section 2000e5(f)(1), the time limit for filing suit after exhausting administrative remedies, to the federal employee context.1 0°
The District of Columbia Circuit analyzed and refuted the
sovereign immunity arguments in Mondy v. Secretary of the
Army,10 ' and determined that section 2000e-16(c) may be equitably modified.10 2 The court noted that emphatic language is
one sign of congressional intent that a time limit is jurisdictional. 10 3 Section 2000e-16(c) contains no such language. 1' 4 The
court also found significant that the provisions of section 2000e5(f)-(k), 05 which govern private actions against private sector
employers, are incorporated by reference in section 2000e-16(c)
to govern private actions against federal employers. 1° 6 Because
the Supreme Court held these provisions subject to equitable
modification in Baldwin County' 07 and Zipes, 0 8 the court
to-sue letter from the EEOC); Hornsby, 787 F.2d at 89-90 (rejecting constructive notice doctrine and holding that mere placing of notice in plaintiff's
mailbox that a certified letter could be picked up at the post office did not
commence running of the § 2000e-16(c) 30-day time limit); Martinez, 738 F.2d
at 1109 (tolling the § 2000e-16(c) 30-day time limit while motion for reconsideration of agency's decision pending in EEOC because of agency's misleading of
plaintiff); Milam, 674 F.2d at 862 (employing FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a) to extend the
§ 2000e-16(c) 30-day time period when the limitations period ended on a

Sunday).
99. Sousa v. NLRB, 817 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
100. 845 F.2d 1051, 1055-57 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
101. Id. at 1056-57. The court noted that equitable tolling of claims against
the government is by no means automatic, because the government enjoys sov-

ereign immunity and waiver of such immunity must be strictly construed. I&.
at 1055.
102. Id- at 1055; see supra note 44 for examples of statutes with emphatic

language.
103. Mondy, 845 F.2d at 1056.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)-(k) (1982).
105. Mondy, 845 F.2d at 1056; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d) (1982).
106. Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984)

(per curiam).
107. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1982).

108. Mondy, 845 F.2d at 1057. The Mondy court found this cross reference
suggestive of a parallel intent for the two provisions. 845 F.2d at 1056. The
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found section 2000e-16(c) subject to equitable modification. 1° 9

II. CONSTRUCTION OF 2000e-16(c) AS A TERM IN A
CONSENT STATUTE: JURISDICTIONAL
PREREQUISITE OR STATUTE OF
LIMITATION?
A thorough analysis of section 2000e-16(c) reveals congressional intent to allow equitable modification-' 0 Circuit courts
and commentators from both camps either engage in minimal
analysis of the sovereign immunity doctrine and its applicable
rules of construction, or extend analyses used in private sector
cases to the federal sector without any analysis of sovereign immunity.'
Because of flaws in this reasoning, and because of
the importance of a correct construction of section 2000e-16(c)
to both the federal government"12 and the federal employee
plaintiff,"13 this section first critiques the circuit courts' analyses, and then proposes a more complete analysis of the time
limit.
court also noted that, as in Zipes, the provisions granting jurisdiction to federal district courts were in no way tied to the time limitations in § 2000e-16(c).
Id. Mondy sued the wrong defendant, naming his activity commander instead
of the Secretary of the Army. I& at 1052. Then, because he was proceeding in
forma pauperis, he relied on United States marshals to serve process within 6
days of filing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Id The marshals, however, delayed
service for four months. I- The result of the court's holding was to toll the
time limit during the marshals' four-month delay, thus allowing his Rule 15(c)
motion to amend to name the correct defendant to relate back to the original
timely complaint. IL at 1057.
The Eighth Circuit apparently has adopted the Mondy analysis. Warren v.
Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156, 1159 (8th Cir. 1989). In Warren, the court
tolled the time limit during the pendency of the pro se plaintiff's motions to
proceed in forma pauperis and for appointment of counsel. Id. at 1161. The
plaintiff sued the Department of the Army instead of the Secretary of the
Army. Id. at 1157-58.
109. See infra notes 148-81 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 116-47 and accompanying text.
111. The federal government has an interest in maintaining its inherent
sovereign immunity and in ensuring that consent statutes are not construed to
waive immunity more broadly than intended. The federal courts have an interest in maintaining their institutional competence by not overstepping the
bounds of the jurisdiction granted them. If jurisdiction has been granted, the
courts have an interest in hearing the claims of plaintiffs and remedying discrimination in meritorious cases.
112. The plaintiff has an interest in knowing the nature of § 2000e-16(c) to
prepare a suit and to avoid harsh results from procedural errors by loss of his
cause of action in federal court.
113. See infra notes 116-30 and accompanying text.
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CRITICISMS OF THE CURRENT CIRCUIT COURTS' ANALYSES
OF SECTION 2000E-16(c)

Criticisms of the Jurisdictional Circuits' Analyses

Labelling the section 2000e-16(c) time limit as a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit absolutely bars the claims of untimely plaintiffs. The jurisdictional circuits fall into two
analytical categories. Some circuits apply the rule of strict construction because section 2000e-16(c) is a term in a consent statute. 14 Other circuits extend pre-Zipes case law from the
private sector to construe section 2000e-16(c), which applies to
the public sector." 5 Both approaches are flawed." 6 The jurisdictional courts and commentators, therefore, not only reach
the wrong conclusion about section 2000e-16(c) in particular,
some also confuse the nature of jurisdictional bars in general.
a.

The "StrictConstruction" Circuits

The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have applied a strict construction rule to construe section 2000e-16(c) because it constitutes a term in the sovereign's consent to be sued.li 7 These
114. See infra notes 131-47 and accompanying text.
115. In addition, one commentator calls the time limit "jurisdictional," but
argues for estopping the government from asserting this defense in cases when
it engages in "affirmative misconduct." CorneU Note, supra note 10, at 217-20.
This commentator seeks the best of both theories, but ignores the fact that a
jurisdictional labelling of the section 2000e-16(c) time limit restricts the federal district court's subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore the court is institutionally incompetent to hear untimely filed claims. The theory is flawed,
therefore, because no amount of equity, even "affirmative government misconduct," can overcome such a subject matter jurisdiction barrier. Insurance
Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)
(stating that subject matter jurisdiction can never be created by estoppel); see
supra notes 51, 54 (discussing difference between statutes of limitation and jurisdictional time limits). Thus, the Cornell Note's conclusion is similar to the
Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Paulk v. Department of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79,
81, 83 (7th Cir. 1987), in which the court labeled the time limit "jurisdictional"
but allowed for equitable tolling.
116. Brown v. Department of Army, 854 F.2d 77, 78 (5th Cir. 1988); Harris
v. Brock, 835 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1987). One commentator also agrees
with these strict construction circuits. Boston Note, supra note 8, at 1183-85
(arguing that Supreme Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence requires a
"clear statement" of consent to a particular term or condition to suit and that
such a statement is absent in § 2000e-16(c)). This writer's analysis fails to acknowledge that the Supreme Court does not in fact require a "clear statement" of congressional intent and is willing to investigate the totality of
circumstances surrounding the statute's enactment in order to ascertain congressional intent.
117. Brown, 854 F.2d at 78; Harris,835 F.2d at 1193.
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circuits, however, merely cite the "strict construction" rule as a
label, and do not analyze the Supreme Court's sovereign immunity case law to see how to apply the rule." 8 The Seventh Circuit, for example, cites to the general rule of strict construction
of consent statutes,119 and then concludes that because section
2000e-16(c) is a condition to suit against the sovereign, these
time limits define a district court's subject matter
jurisdiction. 120
The Fifth Circuit also misapplies the Supreme Court's sovereign immunity rules of construction. 12 1 The court has stated
merely that the section 2000e-16(c) time limit "is a jurisdictional requirement and this statute must be strictly construed."' 2 2 Again, this statement oversimplifies the proper
rules of construction to apply to consent statutes. It does not
follow that the time limit must be a jurisdictional prerequisite
to suit simply because section 2000e-16(c) is a consent statute.
Strict construction applies only to consent statutes with clear
language.m Only when emphatic language prohibits equitable
modification of a time limit in a consent statute should a court
refuse to imply consent to such a term.124 Such language is absent in section 20OOe-16(c).32s Thus, to ascertain congressional
intent, courts cannot rely on the strict construction rule but
118. Harris, 835 F.2d at 1193. The court "recognized that because the
United States is generally immune from suit, the terms under which it consents to be sued define a court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit." I& Therefore, "[c]ourts must strictly construe any conditions attached to the
government's waiver of sovereign immunity." Id.
119. Id (citing Sims v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (7th Cir. 1984)).
From this language, it appears that the court believes that any time limit in a
consent statute must be a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. This is not the
rule. The Supreme Court has refused to construe time limits in consent statutes "unduly restrictively," Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983),
thus leaving open the possibility of equitable modification in appropriate statutes. Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit ignores the Supreme Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence, which applies the strict construction rule only
when statutory language is emphatically clear. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Because the language of section 2000e-16(c) is not emphatically
clear, the court should look to other sources evidencing congressional intent as
to the nature of section 2000e-16(c), such as legislative history and statutory
purpose. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
120. Brown, 854 F.2d at 78.
121. Id (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590 (1941)).
122. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
123. Id
124. See supra note 36 for text of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1982).
125. 509 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 1975). Cleveland was a pre-Zipes case that construed private sector time limits in Title VII as jurisdictional prerequisites to
suit. Id. at 1030.
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must look beyond statutory language to the totality of circumstances surrounding the statute's enactment.
b.

The Ninth Circuit'sAnalysis

All the Ninth Circuit's section 2000e-16(c) cases rely directly or indirectly on Cleveland v. Douglas Aircraft Company.12 6 After Zipes, Cleveland no longer represents good law.
The Ninth Circuit has never reevaluated its jurisdictional hold7
ing on section 2000e-16(c) since Zipes overruled Cleveland.m2
If the court based its initial extension of Cleveland to section
20o0e-16(c) on similarities between the private and federal sector time limits,m2 then it should allow equitable modification of
section 2000e-16(c) now that private sector time limits can be
extended. n 9 The Ninth Circuit at least should address the continuing validity of Cleveland, and should interpret section
2000e-16(c) using the Supreme Court's rules of construction for
consent statutes.
The jurisdictional circuits recognize the hardship a jurisdictional construction of section 2000e-16(c) poses to Title VII
plaintiffs, who usually proceed pro se.' 30 If these circuits would
abandon the jurisdictional construction of section 2000e-16(c),
they could effectuate Congress' intent without confusing other
areas of Title VII, because the aggregate effect of the circumstances underlying enactment of section 2000e-16(c) manifest
an intent to allow equitable modification. 31 '
126. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
127. The court simply stated that "[t]his thirty-day time period is jurisdic-

tional" and cited to Cleveland without analysis. Mahroom, 563 F.2d at 1374.
128. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (holding the
§ 2000e-5(e) time limit for filing initial charge with EEOC not a jurisdictional
prerequisite to suit). See Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S.
147, 151-52 (1984) (per curiam) (holding the § 2000e-5(f)(1) 90-day time limit
for filing of civil suit subject to equitable tolling in an appropriate case).
129. The jurisdictional circuits, therefore, in a seemingly subconscious desire to effectuate congressional intent to allow equitable extension of § 2000e16(c), resort to strained construction of other terms in the statute, or inconsistent statements of the jurisdictional rule. See Rice v. Hamilton Air Force Base

Commissary, 720 F.2d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 1983) (construing filing of right-tosue letter with motion for appointment of counsel as a complaint); Paulk v.
Department of Air Force, 831 F.2d 79, 83 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that § 2000e16(c) is "jurisdictional" but allowing for equitable tolling of time limit

anyway).
130. See infra notes 148-81 and accompanying text.
131. Sousa v. NLRB, 817 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam).

1396

2.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[[Vol. 74:1371

Criticisms of the Equitable Modification Circuits' Analyses

a. The Zipes Extension Circuits
The Second,132 Third,l 3 Tenth,13 and Eleventh'35 Circuits
merely extend the holdings in Zipes or other private sector
cases, allowing equitable modification of the section 2000e-5(e)
time limit. Two commentators also argue for equitable modification of section 2000e-16(c) based on extension of private sector time limit decisions. 136 This analysis ignores the fact that
section 2000e-16(c) is a term in the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity to suit, and therefore should not be interpreted in the same manner as statutes governing private suits.
Although these courts and commentators reach the correct conclusion, their weak analyses make them less persuasive and
further confuse the application of Title VII to federal
employees.
Another problem with this analysis is that the time limit
construed in Zipes served a different purpose than does section
2000e-16(c). The Zipes Court construed section 2000e-5(e),
which governs filing of initial charges with the EEOC.1 37 Be-

cause section 2000e-16(c) governs subsequent filing in federal
court, congressional intent as to the nature of the two time limits may differ.138
The rationale behind the Zipes holding, therefore, may be
inapplicable to the federal employee context. Equitable modifi132. Hornsby v. United States Postal Serv., 787 F.2d 87, 89 (3d Cir. 1986).
133. Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107, 1109-10 (10th Cir. 1984).
134. Ross v. United States Postal Serv., 814 F.2d 616, 616-17 (11th Cir.
1987); Milam v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 860, 862 (11th Cir. 1982).
135. Chicago Note, supra note 10, at 1018. The Chicago Note is a pre-Zipaes
analysis arguing that all time limits in Title VII can be equitably modified.
The author, however, never addresses those time limits applicable to federal
employees, and therefore never considers the impact of sovereign immunity.
Rather, the author concludes that "equitable modification should be allowed
under Title VII... in the absence of any evidence that Congress meant to preclude it." I&; accord Davis Note, supra note 10, at 776-79. The Davis Note
does analyze federal employee time limits separately, but addresses the sovereign immunity issue only briefly in footnotes. I& at 768 n.78, 769 n.109. The
author merely concludes that the same policy reasons for allowing equitable
modification in the private sector, "sympathy for the inexperienced plaintiff
and preventing employer prejudice," should also apply in the federal sector.
Id. at 779.
136. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982).
137. The purposes underlying § 2000e-5(e) are beyond the scope of this
Note, but if the equitable extension circuits are going to rely on the Zipes rationale, they should address this difference.
138. See infra notes 148-81 and accompanying text.
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cation circuits must recognize that section 2000e-16(c) is a term
in a consent statute, and address and refute the sovereign immunity arguments of the jurisdictional circuits. Because no emphatic language bars equitable modification of section 2000e16(c), the courts can use the totality of circumstances approach
to construction.139
b.

The District of Columbia Circuit'sAnalysis

Of the equitable modification circuits, the District of Columbia Circuit's analysis in Mondy v. Secretary of the Army, 140
is the most defensible construction of section 2000e-16(c). The
Mondy court recognized the difference between public sector
and private sector time limits, and the role of sovereign
immunity. 4 1
The Mondy court examined two factors in the totality of
circumstances approach. 14 First, the court noted that section
2000e-16(c) contains no emphatic or 'jurisdictional' type language. 143 The court found the absence of such language suggested that Congress did not intend the time limit to be
jurisdictional.'" Next, the court stressed that the context of
section 2000e-16(c) in the statutory scheme suggests it may be
equitably modified. 145 The court noted the Zipes Court had
stressed that the grant of jurisdiction is in a provision separate
from that governing time limits, suggesting that the time limits
are not jurisdictional.146
The Mondy court's analysis could be strengthened in two
ways. First, courts should acknowledge expressly that the
"strict construction" rule is inapplicable to section 2000e-16(c),
because no express language prohibits equitable modification. 47
Courts, therefore, can ascertain congressional intent using the
totality of circumstances approach.-48 Once courts establish
that the totality approach supplies the rule of construction,
they may determine congressional intent from all available
139. 845 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
140. Id. at 1055.
141. I- at 1056-57.

142. Id at 1056.
143. Mondy v. Secretary of the Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1055-56 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
144. Id- at 1054, 1056.
145. Id. The jurisdictional provisions, § 2000e-5(f)-(k), govern both private

and federal employees.
146. Id at 1056.
147. See suira notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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sources. Courts could bolster the Mondy reasoning by analyzing legislative history and the purposes of the statute. By analyzing all factors, courts can illuminate how a jurisdictional
reading of section 2000e-16(c) would frustrate congressional intent by subjecting plaintiffs to unintended hardships that often
result in loss of their cause of action in federal court.
A PROPOSED ANALYSIS OF SECTION 200OE-16(c)

B.

Because section 2000e-16(c) is a condition of the sovereign's
consent to be sued, courts must apply different rules of construction than they apply to statutes governing purely private
rights. These rules of construction must be gleaned from the
Supreme Court's sovereign immunity case law. This case law
establishes three steps to construction of terms in consent
statutes.
1.

The Three Tier Approach to Construction of Consent
Statutes

First, the court should scrutinize the statutory language to
see if Congress has expressly prohibited equitable modification
of the time limit.149 Such express prohibitions take the form of
mandatory language "forever barring" claims after a specified
time period. 15° Scrutiny of the language of section 2000e-16(c)
reveals no such express prohibition of equitable modification;
the statute requires merely that suits must be brought in federal court "within thirty days" of receipt of notice of the
5
agency's final action.' '
Next, the court must determine whether the particular
term that a plaintiff argues should be read into the statute constitutes an especially extraordinary condition of suit. 152 If the
153
term is extraordinary, as are awards of prejudgment interest
1
or attorney's fees, M then the consent statute must contain express and unequivocal consent to the term.'5
Equitable modification of time limits is not such an extraordinary condition of suit. The Supreme Court has stated
149. See idi for examples of statutes with such express prohibitions.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1982); see supra note 36 for text of § 2000e-

16(c).
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 316-18 (1986).
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 (1983).
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983).
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that time limits in consent statutes must not be construed "un-

duly restrictively,"'z 6 implying that equitable modification
would be allowed in an appropriate case. Thus, section 2000e16(c) need not contain express consent to equitable modification of its time limit. When express consent is absent, the
Court has used a totality approach to ascertain congressional
intent.
Finally, in the absence of language expressly prohibiting
equitable modification of section 2000e-16(c), the court must
look at the totality of circumstances underlying the statute's
enactment to ascertain whether equitably modifying the time
limit is consistent with congressional intent. Factors to consider in this totality approach are the absence of emphatic language, the context of section 2000e-16(c) in the statutory
scheme, the statute's legislative history, and the underlying
statutory purpose. 157
2.

Construction of Section 2000e-16(c) Under the Totality of
the Circumstances Approach

Analysis of the totality of the circumstances reveals that
Congress intended federal employees to receive the same rights
and access to the federal courts as private employees with employment discrimination claims. Private employees have the
right to equitable modification of Title VII time limits in appropriate circumstances. 5 8 The courts also should allow equitable
modification of section 2000e-16(c), therefore, in appropriate
circumstances. The following analysis demonstrates that equitable modification is consistent with congressional intent as expressed in the legislative history and the broad remedial
purposes of Title VII and the Equal Employment Act of 1972.
a.

The Language of Section 2000e-16(c)

The presence of especially emphatic language in a time
limitation can be determinative of congressional intent to disal156.

See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.

157. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (holding the
§ 2000e-5(e) time limit for filing initial charge with EEOC not a jurisdictional
prerequisite to suit); see Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S.
147, 151 (1984) (per curiam) (holding the § 2000e-5(f)(1) 90-day time limit for
filing of civil suit subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases).
158. See Mondy v. Secretary of the Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1055-56 (D.C. Cir.

1988); see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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low equitable modification. 159 It follows that the absence of
such language, while not dispositive, is one factor suggesting an
intent to allow equitable modification of section 2000e-16(c).
Section 2000e-16(c) does not contain express language prohibiting equitable modification. In fact, like section 2000e-(f)(1), section 2000e-16(c) merely requires that suit be filed "within" a
certain number of days;' 60 the Court has held the section 2000e5(f)(1) time limit subject to equitable tolling.1 1 When language
of express consent to or prohibition of equitable modification is
absent or ambiguous, courts may look elsewhere to ascertain
congressional intent.162
b.

The Context of Section 2000e-16(c) in the Statutory Scheme

of Title VII
Several aspects Title VII's structure suggest an intent to allow equitable modification. First, the provision granting jurisdiction to the federal courts over Title VII actions does not
expressly require timely filing, and is not limited by any reference to the section 2000e-16(c) time limitation. 163 Congress did
not condition federal jurisdiction on timely filing of complaints.
Second, section 2000e-16 incorporates by reference the provisions governing filing of suits against private sector employers.164 In Zipes and Baldwin County, the Supreme Court held
that these provisions may be equitably modified. 6 5 The Court
interpreted this incorporation by reference of the procedures
governing private sector employees to provide federal employees with the same right to a trial de novo in federal court as is
granted to other employees. 66 The District of Columbia Circuit has used this incorporation by reference to grant federal
employees the same right to equitable modification of Title VII
time limits as is granted to private sector employees in sections
159. Compare language of § 2000e-16(c), supra note 36, with language of
§ 2000e-5(f)(1), supra note 17.
160. Baldwin County, 466 U.S. at 151.
161. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1982). The Court in Zipes considered this
structure to indicate congressional intent to allow equitable modification of

§ 2000e-5(f)(1). Zipes, 355 U.S. at 393.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d) (1982). This section provides that "[t]he provisions of section 2000e-5(f) through (k) of this title, as applicable, shall govern
civil actions brought hereunder." Id.
164. Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393; see Baldwin County, 466 U.S. at 151.
165. Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 845-48 (1976).

166. Mondy v. Secretary of the Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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2000e-5(e) and 2000e-5(f)(1). 167
c. Legislative History of the Equal Employment Act of 1972
The legislative history of the Equal Employment Act of
1972 manifests Congress' intent to allow equitable extension of
section 2000e-16(c). The Senate Report noted that not only did
federal employees lack sufficient impartial remedies at an
agency level, they had no access to the courts to seek relief, primarily because the employees could not overcome the federal
168
government's sovereign immunity defense.
The Senate Report states that section 2000e-16(c) is
designed to provide federal employees with "the full rights
available in the courts as are granted to individuals in the private sector under title VII.'u 6 9 The Supreme Court has cited

the Senate Report language in holding that the 1972 Act grants
federal employees the same right to a trial de novo as private
employees. 170 Because private employees under Title VII have
the right in federal court to equitable modification of their time
limitations, 171 an analogous intent exists for allowing equitable
modification of section 2000e-16(c).
By enacting section 2000e-16, therefore, Congress sought
not only to provide regularized agency review of employment
discrimination complaints, but also to provide access to the
courts for federal employees without the need to overcome a
sovereign immunity defense. This legislative history suggests
167. SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 16; accord HousE REPORT, supra
note 25, at 23, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2158 (stating that there can exist no justification for anything but a vigorous effort to
accord federal employees the same rights as private employees).
168.

SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 16.

169. Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 841 (1976). The dissent in Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986), cited the same language to argue that Congress also consented to awards of prejudgment interest to federal
employees. Id. at 325 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent stated.
[t]he legislative history of the 1972 amendments thus demonstrates
that Congress intended that federal employees enjoy the same rights
and remedies in the courts as private litigants. It therefore follows
that Congress intended that in situations where private sector Title
VII litigants may recover prejudgment interest on their attorney's
fees awards, so may federal employees.

Id (footnote omitted). See supra note 43 for a discussion of the majority view
in Library of Congress.

170. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982); see Baldwin
County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) (per curiam).
171. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968).
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congressional intent to remove sovereign immunity barriers
from employment discrimination litigation.
d.

The Purpose of Title VII and the 1972 Amendments

Allowing equitable modification serves the purposes of section 2000e-16. Remedial statutes are to be construed broadly.172
The Court has construed Title VII as a broad remedial statute,173 and therefore has rejected technical readings of the statute because individuals, rather than trained lawyers, initiate
the process and often proceed pro se in the subsequent civil
74
suit.'
The broad remedial purpose of Title VII to provide access
to the federal courts suggests an intent to allow equitable modification, especially in light of the hardships pro se plaintiffs suffer from a strict jurisdictional reading of section 2000e-16(c). A
pro se plaintiff has thirty days to overcome a variety of procedural traps. First, if she is in a circuit that applies the doctrine
of constructive notice, the section 2000e-16(c) thirty-day time
limit may begin to run before the plaintiff actually receives notice of her right to sue. 175
Next, the employee must determine who to name as a defendant based on "delphic" language' 76 in section 2000e-16(c). 177
If the plaintiff names the wrong defendant she probably will be
unable to amend her complaint pursuant to rule 15(c) unless
she can serve her complaint and then amend it within the time
limit. 7 8
The plaintiff also might forfeit her day in court if she exercises her right to file motions for appointment of counsel and to
proceed in forma pauperis. 179 A jurisdictional reading of sec172. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 526 (1972).
173. Id.
174. Irwin v. Veterans Admine, 874 F.2d 1092, 1093 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding
that receipt of plaintiff's right-to-sue letter by her attorney's office constituted
constructive notice sufficient to begin the § 2000e-16(c) time period), cert
granted, 110 S. Ct. 1109 (1990).
175.

Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156, 1157 (8th Cir. 1989).
For text of § 2000e-16(c), see supra note 36.
177. Williams v. United States Postal Serv., 873 F.2d 1069, 1074 n.6 (7th Cir.
1989) (holding that plaintiff could not amend complaint to correct defendant
after 30-day period expired); Bell v. Veterans Admin. Hosp., 826 F.2d 357, 359

176.

(5th Cir. 1987) (same); see Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 29 (1986).
178. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1982).
179. E.g., Bell, 826 F.2d at 359. To avoid this inequitable result, the jurisdictional circuits have resorted to strained legal analysis. In Paulk v. Department
of Air Force, 830 F.2d 79, 80-82 (7th Cir. 1987), the court allowed tolling during
a pending motion to proceed in forma pauperis, stating that § 2000e-16(c) is ju-
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tion 2000e-16(c) does not allow tolling of the thirty-day period
while these motions are pending in the federal court.18 0 Finally, pro se plaintiffs may effect service of process on the federal defendant incorrectly or incompletely because of ignorance
or misunderstanding of complex procedural requirements.' 8 1 If
the correct defendant does not have notice of the suit within
82
thirty days, the suit will be dismissed.
In light of the congressional purpose in enacting a broad
remedial statute to provide access to the courts, it is unlikely
that Congress intended to trap pro se plaintiffs in procedural
snares. Allowing equitable modification of section 2000e-16(c)
furthers that statute's purpose to provide access to the federal
courts for federal employees with employment discrimination
claims. The totality of circumstances surrounding the enactment of section 2000e-16(c), therefore, suggests congressional
intent to allow equitable modification of its thirty-day time
limit.
This analysis takes into account the jurisdictional circuits'
concern for sovereign immunity by completely analyzing congressional intent. It also provides a rationale for concluding
that section 2000e-16(c) may be equitably modified without relying solely on the rationale of Zipes, a private sector case.
CONCLUSION
In 1972, Congress waived federal sovereign immunity to allow federal employees to sue for employment discrimination.
As a condition to suit, Congress included a thirty-day time limit
for employees to file suit in federal district court after exhausting administrative remedies. The circuit courts have disagreed
over the nature of this time limit, some interpreting it as a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit and others construing it as a
statute of limitations that may be equitably modified.
Using the totality of circumstances approach reveals that
Congress intended to allow equitable modification of the section 2000e-16(c) thirty-day time limit for federal employees to
risdictional "unless some exception is applicable here." Id. at 81. The Ninth
Circuit has strained the meaning of other terms in § 2000e-16(c) to avoid similar harsh results. Rice v. Hamilton Air Force Base Commissary, 720 F.2d 1082,

1085 (9th Cir. 1983).
180. Harris v. Brock, 835 F.2d 1190, 1191 (7th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff failed to
serve properly the United States as required by FED. R. CIV. P. 4).
181. See Schiavone 477 U.S. at 29.
182.

Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat.

fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1982)).

1 (codi-
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file suit in federal court. The statute does not contain emphatic
language manifesting a jurisdictional intent. The legislative
history indicates a two-fold purpose: to provide federal employees with access to the courts without facing a sovereign immunity defense, and to provide federal employees with the same
rights in court as are granted to private employees - whose filing time limits may be equitably modified. Given the broad remedial purpose of Title VII, it is unlikely that Congress
intended for pro se plaintiffs to lose their access to the courts
because of failure to comply in thirty days with complex procedural requirements. Courts, therefore, should allow section
2000e-16(c) to be equitably modified in appropriate
circumstances.
Cynthia Reed

